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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Growth accounting provides a useful
framework for analysing the medium to longer-
term developments in real GDP and supply-side
factors, and can thus help in assessing potential
output growth. Applications of this framework
have received increased interest from policy-
makers in recent years, reflecting the need to
analytically underpin for instance the debate on
the so-called new economy and the likely impact
of information and communication technologies
on productivity, as well as the discussion on the
growth and employment objectives for Europe
stated in the 2000 Lisbon agenda.
The growth accounting framework is
empirically motivated and does not rely on
adopting ex ante the implications of theoretical
frameworks. It does not therefore aim to explain
the fundamental underlying forces, such as
preferences, institutions and economic policies,
that drive the evolution of supply-side factors,
nor does it take into account the linkages
between developments in these factors. In this
respect, growth accounting exercises can be
seen as a first step towards understanding the
longer-term growth process and as a useful
complement to model-based approaches to
estimating and assessing potential output. This
is particularly true for any production function-
based approach.
The growth accounting exercise conducted in
this paper decomposes euro area real GDP
growth in the period since 1980 into the
contributions from total factor productivity,
capital and the labour supply. The main findings
are as follows.
First, growth in measured total factor
productivity has been the single most important
contributor to medium to longer-term growth,
explaining roughly half of the average rate of
growth in real GDP of 2.1%. Developments in
the gross capital stock also made a significant
contribution to real GDP growth, while the
contribution from total hours worked was close
to zero. When assessing these quantities, it
needs to be borne in mind that growth in total
factor productivity is derived as an unexplained
residual and is thus a catch-all for both
unobserved technological progress and all
problems associated with the measurement of
capital and labour inputs. Its contribution to real
GDP growth should thus not be interpreted as
an invariable number that depends only on
random innovations. Nevertheless, for policy-
makers this also underlines the important role
that structural policies can play in raising
overall economic efficiency and thereby
fostering medium to longer-term growth.
Second, the decomposition of growth shows
that there have been substantial changes in the
individual contributions to growth between the
1980s and the 1990s. In the first period more
than half of real GDP growth was explained by
total factor productivity, while the remainder
was accounted for by capital. Labour had a
broadly neutral effect on growth due to the fact
that the positive contribution from growth in the
labour force was offset by a rise in the
unemployment rate and a fall in average hours
worked. For the 1990s, the results show a clear
decline in the contribution to growth from total
factor productivity, which then explained less
than half of real GDP growth. The contribution
from capital was broadly unchanged compared
with that in the 1980s, while that from labour
increased and explained around one-fifth of real
GDP growth. The higher contribution to growth
from the labour supply in the 1990s was
accounted for by a decrease in the
unemployment rate and a slower decline in
hours worked. One factor behind this
development was the moderation in average real
wage growth which, inter alia, allowed for an
increase in the number of lower-skilled
workers. The flip side of this was a decline
in average labour productivity growth. On
balance, the opposite movements in the
contributions to growth implied that average
real GDP growth declined only marginally
between the 1980s and the 1990s.
Third, the paper shows that the contributions
from supply-side factors can exhibit significant
fluctuations over relatively short horizons. The
rates of growth in total factor productivity and5
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total hours worked have standard deviations of
1 percentage point or more, and while these
numbers reflect to a large extent the impact of
business cycle fluctuations, the data suggest
that even correcting for these fluctuations
would leave considerable variation in the rates
of growth of supply-side factors. This suggests
that the estimates of potential output growth
in individual years that are compiled from
the contributions of supply-side factors
do not necessarily reflect a sustainable rate
of non-inflationary growth. Separating the
developments in supply-side factors into
sustainable rates of growth on the one hand and
more temporary movements on the other is
inevitably associated with a number of
uncertainties. Therefore, before concluding
whether a structural change implying a
permanent change in output growth has taken
place, it is necessary to examine the source of
the change. Growth accounting can provide an
important input to such an examination.
Fourth, the paper shows that demographic
developments have not been favourable for
growth over the past business cycle and are
projected to become a major reason for concern
with regard to future growth. Forward-looking
growth accounting exercises show that these
adverse demographic developments would
reduce average real GDP growth in the period
up to 2010 to below 2% and in the period up to
2020 further to around 1½% if no compensation
is achieved through higher contributions from
other supply-side factors. There appear to be
two main areas where improvements are
warranted and where the Lisbon agenda states
the relevant objectives. On the one hand,
structural reforms in product and labour
markets could improve the business
environment in a way that allows for more
innovation and technical progress. On the other
hand, there is considerable potential for
increasing the contributions to growth from the
labour supply, considering that the (structural)
unemployment rate in the euro area is still
relatively high by international standards and
that the participation rate and average hours
worked are relatively low. With appropriate
reforms, there is thus some scope for sustaining
or even raising medium to longer-term output
growth despite adverse demographic
developments.
Growth accounting exercises are surrounded by
a number of caveats and policy-makers need to
be cautious in drawing policy conclusions
based on the ceteris paribus scenario analysis
conducted on the basis of these exercises.
Developments in the individual supply-side
factors are intertwined and policy changes
directed at a particular factor of growth may
have reinforcing or offsetting effects on other
factors. This complexity needs to be borne in
mind when using growth accounting
frameworks for policy advice.6
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1 INTRODUCTION
Notions of the medium and longer-term growth
prospects of the economy are central to many
policy areas. These prospects are often
summarised in an estimate or an assumption
concerning potential output growth, which is an
unobservable measure of the economy’s
aggregate supply-side capacity and its scope for
sustainable, non-inflationary growth. There are
many different statistical and theoretical
methods to estimate potential output, each with
its specific advantages and disadvantages. On
the one hand, policy-makers can draw on a
variety of methods and thus build on the
information that is gained from evaluating and
cross-checking the range of estimates. On the
other hand, they may choose a preferred method
that is perceived to provide the most relevant
information for a specific policy area. Whatever
the approach, there is a broad consensus that the
uncertainties surrounding the concepts and
estimation methods used for potential output
growth call for considerable caution to be
exercised in drawing policy conclusions.
Most estimated series of potential output
growth tend to exhibit fluctuations over
relatively short horizons and the estimate at a
given point in time does not therefore
necessarily reflect a sustainable rate of non-
inflationary growth. The reasons for such
fluctuations include the presence of temporary
supply shocks, the persistence of demand
shocks and methodological difficulties in
properly separating trends and cycles. For
monetary policy purposes, it is useful to apply a
concept of potential output growth that looks
through these fluctuations and focuses on the
more permanent, structural factors of growth.
In the monetary policy strategy of the ECB, this
concept is reflected in the assumption for trend
potential output growth in the euro area, which
plays an important role in the derivation of the
reference value for monetary growth and thus in
the assessment of monetary developments.
This paper views potential output growth in the
euro area from the narrow perspective of the
information that is incorporated in growth
accounting frameworks, largely abstracting
from conceptual and methodological issues.
Growth accounting breaks down economic
growth into the contributions from supply-side
factors that determine the evolution of potential
output growth over medium and longer-term
horizons. These factors typically include the
growth in physical capacity through investment,
the rate of technological progress, and the
growth in the available supply of labour.
Understanding the dynamics of the main factors
underlying economic growth helps policy-
makers to gauge the impact of growth-
enhancing measures. On a more conceptual
level, it can also provide them with information
on the usefulness that the various measures of
potential output growth have for policy analysis
and advice.
The increased interest that growth accounting
exercises have received from policy-makers in
recent years is mostly related to two specific
policy issues, to which growth accounting
provided a useful analytical underpinning.
First, it underpinned the debate on the so-called
new economy. Underlying this was the question
on the nature of the impact that the large-scale
emergence of information and communication
technologies (ICT) in the second half of the
1990s had on technical progress, aggregate
productivity and long-term growth. Second,
growth accounting underpinned the discussion
on the growth and employment objectives for
Europe stated in the 2000 Lisbon agenda. In
both cases, the recourse to growth accounting
helped in the international comparison and
benchmarking of growth performances, as well
as in the identification of structural bottlenecks
to stronger long-term growth.
The range assumed for trend potential output
growth in the derivation of the ECB’s reference
value for monetary growth reflects the
uncertainties surrounding the impact of
structural changes on the future path of long-
term growth. Growth accounting provides
useful information on the scale and pace of past
changes in the dynamics of the factors of
growth and thus helps to assess the scope
for future changes. In this respect, growth7
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 INTRODUCTION
accounting cannot eliminate the problem
inherent in a forward-looking monetary policy
that the impact of structural changes typically
only becomes visible well after the changes
have occurred. However, once the impact of
these changes has become visible, it helps the
assessment of whether such changes would be
large enough to necessitate a revision of the
assumption for trend potential growth.
The remainder of this paper is organised as
follows. Section 2 describes how the growth
accounting framework is constructed and which
main factors of growth can be derived from it. It
also discusses where important assumptions
and measurement issues enter the framework.
Section 3 analyses for the euro area the
developments in these factors since 1980,
grouped into the three broad categories related
to capital inputs, labour inputs and total factor
productivity. It shows that these developments
display considerable variation over the business
cycle, emphasising the difficulty in determining
underlying trends. Section 4 discusses the
decomposition of growth in the 1980s and
1990s, and presents a scenario analysis of the
impact that changes in specific factors of
growth can have on potential output growth.
Such analysis helps to assess the growth-
enhancing measures that are necessary to
counterbalance the likely negative impact on
economic growth from future demographic
developments. Section 5 concludes, reiterating
that a medium-term concept of potential output
growth should take into account the uncertainty
related to the underlying trends in growth
factors.8
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2 THE GROWTH ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK
1 For some evidence supporting the validity of the Cobb-Douglas
production function for the euro area, see Willman (2002).
Growth models typically provide a theoretical
framework for understanding the fundamental
determinants of economic growth and the
consequences of economic policies for long-run
growth. Growth accounting may be viewed as a
first step towards such an understanding. It
essentially implies breaking down observed real
GDP growth into the contributions from
pertinent factors of growth such as labour,
capital and technology. In this respect, the
growth accounting framework is empirically
motivated and does not rely on adopting ex ante
the implications of theoretical frameworks.
However, it may lay the foundations for a
second step, namely the analysis of the
relationship that exists between developments
in the factors of growth on the one hand, and the
fundamental determinants, such as preferences,
natural resources and economic policies on the
other. Assuming that over medium and longer-
term horizons actual and potential output
growth move in line with one another, real GDP
growth accounting over sufficiently long
periods also allows for inferences about the
contributions that the various factors of growth
make to potential growth.
Growth accounting is an empirical tool, but it is
not completely free of theory. In particular, in
its basic form it assumes that the factors of
growth can be combined in terms of an
aggregate production function. Most
applications assume that the production
function is of the Cobb-Douglas type, with
output  Y produced by three broad inputs:
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Labour inputs are typically measured in terms
of total hours worked H and capital inputs in
terms of the stock of physical capital K, where
the latter is assumed to be proportional to the
flow of services that emanates from it. These
inputs are in principle observable in the data
available from national statistical offices,
although in practice not all these offices provide
them. The parameter α represents the (constant)
elasticity of output with respect to labour.
Under perfect competition (i.e. when in
equilibrium the marginal product of each factor
equals its price), this elasticity can be
approximated by the labour share in national
income. The production function can also be
expressed in terms of capital intensity K/H,
which measures how much capital is used in the
production process per hour worked. The
primary use of growth accounting has
traditionally been to quantify the rate at which
technological efficiency A evolves, which is
assumed to improve the productivity of both
labour and capital alike and is thus also referred
to as total factor productivity (TFP). TFP is
unobservable, but with all other elements in (1)
known, its rate of increase can be derived from
official data as a residual after deducting from
real GDP growth the contributions associated
with changes in hours worked and the capital
stock.
If the measured changes in factor inputs only
reflect changes in the quantities of labour and
capital, the estimate of TFP growth derived
from equation (1) is a catch-all for both
technological progress and all measurement
problems related to changes in the quality of
factor inputs and in their intensity of use. For
example, measures of aggregate hours worked
typically do not take into account differences in
efficiency that may be associated with education
or work experience. Similarly, measures of the
capital stock typically do not take into account
the degree to which capital is used at a specific
point in time. Changes in machine operating
hours of the same capital stock would thus be
reflected in TFP growth. In addition, TFP
growth captures the impact of any erroneous
assumption with regard to the factor share α.
These caveats need to borne in mind when
interpreting estimated TFP growth. This latter
factor is generally the single most important9
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component of long-run growth in advanced
economies.
In order to add more detail to the growth
accounting framework, the generic factors
labour and capital can be broken down
into economically meaningful components,
as described in Annex 1 and discussed in
Section 3. Such a decomposition shows that
a lower contribution to output growth from
one component can be compensated for by a
correspondingly higher contribution from one
or several other components.
The impact of capital and labour components on
output growth is proportional to their respective
factor shares. According to national accounts
data for the euro area, compensation of
employees accounted on average for somewhat
more than 50% of GDP in the period since
1980. Adjusted for the imputed labour income
of the self-employed, the labour share was
on average somewhat higher than 60% (see
Chart 1). Changes in the labour input
components thus have, a priori, a somewhat
bigger impact on output growth than those in
the capital components. For instance, if the rate
of growth in the labour supply were to increase
by 1 percentage point, this would translate into
an additional 0.6 percentage point of output
growth. If instead the rate of growth in the
capital stock were to increase by 1 percentage
point, the effect would just be 0.4 percentage
point.
The share of (adjusted) compensation in GDP is
the most common measure of the labour share,
but it is subject to a number of caveats. In
particular, such calculations critically hinge on
the assumption that the longer-term average of
the labour share reflects factor prices in a long-
run competitive equilibrium, and that one minus
the labour share reflects the factor share of
capital. It is questionable, for instance, to what
extent the latter holds in a growing economy
where firms typically earn some temporary
monopoly rents from innovation. The empirical
factor share (1-α) based on national accounts
data includes these monopoly rents and might
thus overstate the contribution to growth from
capital and understate that from the residual, i.e.
total factor productivity. Moreover, the value of
(1-α) based on national accounts data includes
the share of GDP that is accounted for by
indirect taxes (minus subsidies) and the value
added used to finance these taxes has partly
been generated by labour inputs. Thus,
allocating the share of taxes (minus subsidies)
proportionately to labour and capital results in a
higher adjusted labour share of around 0.7 and
consequently in a lower capital share (see right-
hand panel of Chart 1).
Source: ECB calculations based on Eurostat national accounts data. 
Note: The labour share corresponds to the ratio of compensation of employees to GDP. The adjusted labour share takes account of the
imputed labour income of the self-employed (assumed to be equivalent to average compensation per employee).
Chart 1 Labour share in the euro area 
(as a percentage of GDP excluding taxes (minus subsidies))  (as a percentage of GDP)
unadjusted
adjusted
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Overall, growth accounting provides a suitable
framework for identifying individual factors of
growth and summarising them in a convenient
way, but the caveats in using the framework
need to be borne in mind. These relate both to
the empirical derivation of the individual
contributions to growth via a production
function and to the ceteris paribus analysis that
is usually conducted on the basis of these
contributions. In this respect, it is particularly
important to bear in mind that in focusing on the
effects that changes in a specific factor may
have on growth, knock-on effects on other
factors, which can be of an offsetting or
amplifying nature, might be neglected. The
following analysis should be seen in this light.11
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3 DISCUSSION OF THE FACTORS OF GROWTH
3.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
This section discusses the patterns of growth in
the individual factors that feature in the growth
accounting framework, focusing on the period
from 1980 to 2003. The reason for limiting the
discussion to only slightly more than the past
two decades essentially reflects the constraints
imposed by the availability of euro area-wide
data. In particular, harmonised national
accounts data necessary for the construction of
euro area-wide data only date back to 1980.
Annex 2 provides more details on the sources
and the construction of the data.
The discussion of the historical developments
in growth factors helps the assessment of
potential output growth in two ways. First, it
enables the inherent variation in the growth
rates of factors such as the labour force and
capital stock to be highlighted. In this paper, no
attempt is made to disentangle these variations
into temporary and permanent components, as
would be the case in model-based production
function approaches – for instance with
regard to estimates of a structural rate of
unemployment such as the NAIRU (non-
accelerating inflation rate of unemployment).
In the context of the growth accounting
framework, this issue is essentially resolved by
focusing on average growth rates in the relevant
series over horizons such as a decade or a full
business cycle. This simplification is less
controversial than might appear at first sight as
a number of the more sophisticated time series-
based methods for extracting the permanent
component of output in essence also amount to a
somewhat arbitrary averaging of the relevant
growth developments. Second, the discussion
of the historical developments in growth factors
sheds some light on the likely causes and
magnitudes of fluctuations in potential output
growth. This helps in assessing the plausibility
of the range for trend potential output growth
assumed in deriving the reference value for
monetary growth, as well as the risks of moving
outside the range over shorter horizons.
Measured in terms of real GDP developments,
there have been two broad economic cycles in
the euro area since the early 1980s, extending
from 1981 to 1993 and from there to 2003.
For simplicity, the two periods will henceforth
be referred to as the 1980s and the 1990s.
The analysis below uses these periods as
benchmarks for the medium to longer-term
developments in factors of growth which are
reflected in trend potential growth. Annex 3
provides some summary statistics on the factors
of growth in the two periods.
3.2 GROWTH IN LABOUR INPUTS
From 1980 to 2003 labour inputs as measured
by total hours worked increased at an average
annual rate of 0.1% (see left-hand panel of
Chart 2). This conceals the fact that employment
growth was on average significantly positive,
but was largely offset by declines in average
hours worked per person employed (see right-
hand panel of Chart 2). However, average
growth in total hours worked increased between
the 1980s and the 1990s, as employment growth
became stronger while the decline in average
hours worked slowed.
The increase in employment growth during the
1990s compared with the 1980s is due to a large
extent to the sustained growth and increased
relative importance of part-time employment.2
For example, according to Labour Force Survey
data, part-time workers accounted for about
17% of total employment in 2003, while the
corresponding number was around 13% in 1993
and less than 10% in the early 1980s. Another
important determinant of overall employment
growth over the same time horizon was
substantial temporary job creation (most of
which was in the category of full-time jobs) in
the 1990s. The almost continuous (although
decelerating) decline in average hours worked
2 For evidence on the increasing relative importance of part-time
employment in total employment in the euro area, see the article
entitled “The composition of employment growth in the euro area
in recent years” in the November 2002 issue of the ECB’s
Monthly Bulletin.12
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since 1980 is also largely explained by the
gradual increase in the share of part-time
employment observed in the euro area.
However, there has also been a gradual decline
in the average hours worked of full-time
workers since the early 1980s. These labour
market developments reflect a number of
cultural and economic factors, with a prominent
example of the latter being the structural
reforms undertaken during the 1990s. In
particular, efforts to promote structural reforms
in euro area countries gained momentum in the
second half of the last decade, with reforms
implemented in the framework of the European
Employment Strategy as of 1997.3
In accounting terms, employment growth can be
expressed in terms of labour force growth and
developments in the unemployment rate (see
equation A2 in Annex I). From this perspective,
it can be observed that average labour force
growth was significantly positive during the
past two decades (see left-hand panel of
Chart 3) and was also broadly unchanged across
3 See also the Eurosystem report entitled “Labour market
mismatches in euro area countries” (March 2002).
Chart 3 Labour force growth and unemployment rate in the euro area
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat and the European Commission.
Note: The horizontal lines show the averages of the various measures in the periods 1981-1993 and 1993-2003 respectively. 
(percentages and changes in percentages) (annual percentage changes)
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Chart 2 Growth in total hours worked and its components in the euro area 
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat, the European Commission and the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.
Note: The horizontal lines show the annual average growth rates in the periods 1981-1993 and 1993-2003 respectively. 
(annual percentage changes) (annual percentage changes)
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the business cycles of the 1980s and the 1990s.
At the same time, while the unemployment rate
was somewhat higher in the 1990s than in the
1980s its average change was close to zero in
the 1990s and thus lower than in the 1980s (see
right-hand panel of Chart 3). This implies that,
in accounting terms, for a given rate of labour
force growth, there was less crowding-out of
employment growth in the 1990s through
adverse unemployment developments.
The unemployment rate typically reacts to some
extent (and often with a lag) to cyclical conditions,
but the fact that average unemployment in the euro
area has been relatively high over the past few
decades points to an important structural
component. One sign for this is that long-term
unemployment accounts for a large proportion of
total unemployment.4 The increase in the average
unemployment rate is often explained in terms of
labour market rigidities, which transformed
temporary increases in unemployment in the
aftermath of adverse shocks into persistently
higher unemployment rates. Frequently
mentioned rigidities include in particular generous
unemployment systems with regard to both the
duration and the level of benefits, but also higher
and less flexible wages, higher payroll taxes,
tighter job security legislation and more
centralised wage bargaining. Labour market
reforms since the mid-1990s seem to be among
the main factors that may have induced a halt in
the overall trend. There are some indications that
the rising trend in the unemployment rate came to
a halt in the mid-1990s, but it is clear that further
comprehensive labour market reforms are needed
to reduce the structural level of unemployment.
The broadly unchanged annual average growth
in the labour force between the 1980s and
1990s conceals diverse developments in
the participation rate and the working age
population. In particular, annual average
growth in the working age population, although
significantly positive over the two cycles,
exhibits a clear declining trend (see left-
hand panel of Chart 4). This was broadly
compensated for by a stronger average increase
in the participation rate in the 1990s than in the
1980s (see right-hand panel of Chart 4).5 To a
large extent, this stronger increase reflects
developments in the labour force participation
of women and is partly related to the stronger
creation of part-time jobs.
4 For a more detailed analysis of the characteristics of euro area
unemployment since the early 1980s, see the article entitled
“Developments in and structural features of the euro area labour
markets” in the May 2000 issue of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin.
For an overview of the causes and consequences of long-term
unemployment in Europe, see Machin and Manning (1999).
5 For a more detailed analysis of developments in the euro area
participation rate, see Genre and Gómez-Salvador (2002).
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat and the European Commission.
Note: The horizontal lines show the averages of the various measures in the periods 1981-1993 and 1993-2003 respectively.
Chart 4 Working age population growth and participation rate in the euro area
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The decline in working age population growth
can, in turn, be attributed largely to a gradual
ageing of the population since the late 1980s,
which has reversed the pattern of the
dependency ratio (see right-hand panel of
Chart 5). By contrast, the average growth of
total population over the two cycles was
broadly unchanged (see left-hand panel of
Chart 5). As will be discussed in Section 4,
demographic developments since the 1990s and
currently available projections suggest that
declining population growth and population
ageing are likely to represent a cause for
concern with regard to growth prospects in the
coming decades.6
Overall, the discussion of developments in the
labour input and its components shows that it is
important to take into account major changes
such as labour market reforms which might
have induced a structural break. Thus, while
comparing developments across cycles or
decades is a natural starting-point, occasionally
it is also necessary to go beyond this
classification of periods to gain an insight into
the likely future sources of growth. As regards
the variability of growth in labour input factors,
there is no clear sign of major changes.
3.3 GROWTH IN CAPITAL INPUTS
This paper measures the economy’s productive
capacity in terms of the gross capital stock. The
results are based on ECB estimates of the euro
area capital stock derived from the data that are
partly available in the national accounts of
individual euro area countries. In the period
since 1980 the euro area gross capital stock
grew at an annual average rate of 2.6%, with
average growth declining by more than
¼ percentage point between the 1980s and
the 1990s (see left-hand panel of Chart 6).7
6 See also McMorrow and Roeger (2003) and the chapter entitled
“How will demographic change affect the global economy?” in
the September 2004 issue of the IMF World Economic Outlook.
7 The capital stock data used in this paper refer to the economy as
a whole. It may be argued, however, that increases in productive
capacity are best measured in terms of business investment
only. At the euro area level, buildings account for roughly
three-quarters of the capital stock, while equipment and
transportation account for the rest. A narrow focus on business
investment only may be problematic for two reasons. First,
there have been statistical breaks over the past years as formerly
state-owned enterprises in the area of public utilities such
as telecommunications, electricity and transportation were
privatised. Second, public infrastructure investment may have an
important bearing on the development and efficiency of private
investment, and the availability of housing may be an important
aspect with regard to labour mobility and supply. Such
considerations suggest that there may be some merit in applying
a wider concept of the capital stock.
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat and the European Commission.
Note: The horizontal lines show the averages of the various measures in the periods 1981-1993 and 1993-2003 respectively.
Chart 5 Population growth and dependency ratio in the euro area
(annual percentage changes) (percentages and changes in percentages)
total population











dependency ratio changes (left-hand scale)
dependency ratio (right-hand scale)



























Drawing on the decomposition of capital stock
growth in equation A6 of Annex I, this decline
reflects essentially a small rise in the average
retirement rate and a small decline in the
investment-to-capital ratio between the two
periods. Variations in these rates (as measured
by their standard deviation) tend to be relatively
small in absolute terms, given that the level of
the capital stock is so much higher than the
levels of investment or depreciation flows. The
average variation of 0.3 percentage point in
capital stock growth in the period since 1980 is
for instance only around one-fifth of that in real
GDP growth. The largest variation in the rate of
growth of the capital stock between individual
years was 0.5 percentage point. With a factor
weight for capital inputs of 0.4, such a variation
would imply an impact on potential output
growth in the year in question of less than
¼ percentage point.
To assess the likely changes in the rate of
growth in the capital stock, it is instructive to
review the possible sources of variation in the
retirement rate and investment-to-capital ratio.
The average variation in these two ratios was
more or less of the same magnitude, although
the variation was generally somewhat lower in
the 1990s than the 1980s. In national accounts
the retirement pattern of installed capital is
mostly estimated under the assumption that the
retirement date of an investment good follows
some pre-specified distribution around an
average service life. If these assumptions do not
change, then the aggregate retirement rate
reflects to a large extent the scale of past
investment vintages. Investment booms and
slumps should then normally imply increases
and decreases in the retirement of capital some
years on. However, this effect is smoothed out
over a number of years due to the assumption
that the retirement dates of the capital goods
pertaining to a particular vintage are distributed
around an average service life. Stronger effects
on the retirement rate can arise if service lives
decline from vintage to vintage, for instance due
to obsolescence as a result of accelerating
technical progress.
Moreover, effects on the overall retirement rate
may come from a rapid change in the structure
of the capital stock, given that the assumptions
for the service lives of structures and equipment
are different. For instance, while computer
equipment is often assumed to have an average
service life of below 10 years, the
corresponding assumption for other types of
equipment is around 20 years, for non-
residential buildings around 50 years and for
housing even longer. For a given rate of overall
investment growth, an increasing share of
equipment investment and a decreasing share of
(percentages)
Source: ECB calculations and estimates based on data from Eurostat and the European Commission.
Note: The horizontal lines in the left-hand chart show the annual average growth rates in the periods 1981-1993 and 1993-2003
respectively. The level of the capital stock is measured at the end of the year, while the left-hand chart shows annual averages.
Chart 6 Growth in the euro area gross capital stock and its components
(annual percentage changes)
gross capital stock
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buildings would shorten the average service life
of capital goods and raise the overall retirement
rate. This effect has received increased attention
in the context of the strong growth in ICT
investment that was recorded in the second half
of the 1990s.
In pure accounting terms, changes in the
investment-to-capital ratio can be decomposed
into changes in the investment-to-GDP ratio
and changes in the ratio of the capital stock to
real GDP, where the latter ratio can be seen as a
measure of capital productivity (see left-hand
panel of Chart 7).8 These components may be
more prominent in applied economic analysis
than the investment-to-capital ratio and have the
advantage that they provide more detailed
information on the sources of variation in
capital stock growth. In the period since 1980
the two components showed clear cyclical
movements that offset each other to a large
extent, thus explaining the relatively small
average variation in the investment-to-capital
ratio. Capital productivity declined between
the 1980s and the 1990s, while the average
investment-to-GDP ratio remained unchanged
at 21%. The stability of the investment-to-GDP
ratio reflects to a large extent the positive
impact in the 1990s that was associated with the
decline in capital goods prices relative to the
GDP deflator. This relative decline was mainly
due to a fall in prices for ICT capital goods
and the increasing share of these goods in
total investment. However, as discussed
previously, a rising share of ICT capital most
likely also implies a higher average rate of
capital retirement, which should have a
counterbalancing effect on the falling capital
goods prices with regard to capital stock
growth.
Depending on the motives for investment,
developments in the investment-to-GDP ratio
may be associated with different developments
in capital productivity. A distinction can
be made between investment for expansion,
replacement, rationalisation and modernisation
purposes. If investment is undertaken with the
aim to substitute capital for labour (for instance
in response to wage cost pressures), then
capital productivity is likely to decline. By
contrast, if investment is of the modernisation
type, then the higher level of technical progress
embodied in the new vintages is likely to raise
capital productivity. However, more productive
















⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅ =
8 The investment-to-capital ratio can be decomposed according to
the following identity, where CU denotes capital utilisation and
Kactual the capital stock effectively used at a point in time.
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat and the European Commission.
Note: The horizontal lines in the right-hand chart show the annual average growth rates in the periods 1981-1993 and 1993-2003
respectively.
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rate of economic obsolescence amongst older
vintages, thus increasing the retirement rate.
Moreover, if capital goods are bought and
installed because of subsidies or tax exemption,
or if they reflect so-called gold-plating, i.e.
investment expenditure not strictly relevant for
the production of output, this may involve some
degree of inefficiency and thereby imply a
lower increase in capital productivity than
would otherwise be associated with newly
installed capital vintages.
A higher productivity of the installed capital
can reflect a higher average rate of capital
utilisation. More permanent changes in this rate
reflect, for instance, changes in the operating
hours of equipment and structures through
changes in individual working hours or in the
number of shifts. More flexibility through an
adjustment of the working hours of employees
can reduce the premia that are otherwise paid
for overtime work or shift work and can lower
the cost of capital. However, a higher rate of
capital utilisation may also imply increased
wear and tear of the capital stock and may then
be associated with shorter service lives and a
higher rate of retirement. Some information on
capital utilisation may be inferred from survey
data on capacity utilisation in the manufacturing
sector. These data suggest that average
utilisation increased between the 1980s and the
1990s (see right-hand panel of Chart 7).
However, given that the manufacturing sector
only accounts for a small fraction of the total
capital stock, no strong conclusions can be
drawn about the impact of capital utilisation on
aggregate capital productivity.
The discussion in this section shows that any
ceteris paribus analysis to account for changes
in capital stock growth needs to bear in mind the
possible interrelationships between the
underlying components such as the investment-
to-GDP ratio, capital productivity and the
retirement rate. Moreover, when assessing the
relatively low variability of capital stock
growth over time, it should be kept in mind that
measures of the capital stock based on the
so-called perpetual inventory method do not
take into account the degree to which the
existing capital stock is actually used. Growth
in actual capital services is thus likely to be
considerably more volatile, but in conventional
growth accounting frameworks this effect
typically only shows up in the residual, i.e. total
factor productivity.
3.4 GROWTH IN TOTAL FACTOR
PRODUCTIVITY
Estimating TFP growth as a residual implies
that it captures the part of real GDP growth
which is unexplained by the contributions from
Chart 8 Growth in euro area total factor productivity
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat, the European Commission and the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.
Note: Capacity utilisation refers to the manufacturing sector.
(annual percentage changes) (percentages)
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labour and capital inputs. Depending on the
specific measures used for these inputs, TFP
growth thus typically reflects much more than
pure technical progress. In particular, if labour
inputs are measured in terms of employed
persons, then estimated TFP growth will pick
up the effect of changes in average hours
worked per person employed. Considering that
in the period since 1980 there has been a
gradual decline in average hours worked, an
adjustment for hours worked results in a
somewhat higher average rate of growth in TFP
(see left-hand panel of Chart 8). Similarly, if
capital inputs are measured by the available
capital stock, TFP growth will pick up the effect
of changes in capital utilisation. As capital
utilisation is a highly cyclical variable that
should not display a longer-term trend,
adjusting for short-term changes in utilisation
will essentially reduce the variability of TFP
growth (see right-hand panel of Chart 8).
Nevertheless, any smoothing of the growth
accounting residual in order to derive a figure
for trend TFP growth that is relevant for
potential output growth necessarily entails
assumptions about the developments in the
normal level of capital utilisation.
Table A3.4 in Annex 3 shows the outcomes for
TFP growth that result from the different
measures of labour and capital inputs. If labour
inputs are measured in terms of total hours
worked and capital inputs by the gross capital
stock, then average TFP growth in the period
since 1980 is estimated to have been 1.0% per
annum, with a standard deviation in the annual
growth rates of 0.8 percentage point.
Incorporating also the information on capacity
utilisation has no impact on the average rate of
growth in TFP, but clearly reduces the
variability of TFP growth. This reduction in
variability might facilitate the detection of
changes in underlying TFP growth and thus in
trend potential output growth (the box examines
the possibility of breaks in trend TFP growth).
Adjusting for the impact from hours worked
and capacity utilisation implies a better
measurement of the quantity dimension of
factor inputs. However, estimated TFP growth
still includes any likely quality changes of
labour and capital inputs and can thus not be
associated with pure technical progress or
innovation discussed later in this section. The
quality aspect is likely to be reflected in the
composition of the labour force and the capital
stock. For instance, an additional working hour
by an experienced worker is likely to account
for a larger increase in output than would an
extra hour by an inexperienced worker. This
implies that for a given rate of growth in overall
output and a given rate of growth in total hours
worked, the contribution from labour inputs
would be larger if at the same time the share of
experienced workers were to have increased.
Similar considerations can be made for
categories like education or gender. It is usually
very difficult to aggregate the various
categories into a meaningful overall labour
quality indictor, but quantitative estimates – to
the extent that they are available – suggest that
labour quality in the euro area has increased
over time. Growth accounting exercises that do
not take into account changes in labour quality
thus tend to understate the contribution to
growth from labour and overstate that from
TFP.
In parallel to the above, quality changes in the
capital stock may reflect shifts between
different categories of capital. In this respect, a
distinction can be made between the more
productive machinery and equipment capital on
the one hand and less productive buildings and
structures on the other.9 In the euro area, the
share of equipment in the total capital stock has
risen somewhat since the 1980s and that of
construction capital has declined, suggesting
that growth in the total capital stock might
understate the contribution from capital inputs,
and that estimated TFP growth should be
correspondingly lower (see left-hand panel of
Chart 9). A quantitative measure of quality-
adjusted capital inputs can be derived by
aggregating the different categories of the
9 For a more detailed discussion of the role of capital quality
improvement with regard to growth and some evidence for the
euro area, see Sakellaris and Vijselaar (2004).19
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capital stock according to their relative user
costs. In this respect, it should be noted that the
relative user cost is inversely related to the
relative depreciation rate of a capital good. The
shift towards ICT capital, for which the
depreciation rate is higher than for other types
of capital, would thus show up as an
improvement in quality and would increase the
contribution to growth from a quality-adjusted
measure of capital inputs.
A crude approximation of the modernity and
thus the quality of the capital stock is the ratio
of the net capital stock to the gross capital
stock. Measures of the gross capital stock,
which typically feature in growth accounting
exercises, implicitly assume that capital goods
provide a constant flow of services over their
entire life. By contrast, the net capital stock
adjusts for depreciation over the service life and
thus takes into account the ageing and possible
quality losses of the capital good. In the euro
area, the ratio of the net capital stock to the
gross capital stock has decreased over time (see
right-hand panel of Chart 9). This would
suggest that the rate of increase in the gross
capital stock overstates the contribution to
growth from capital inputs and that estimated
TFP growth is held down by a loss in quality of
the capital stock. At the same time, the rate of
decline in this modernity ratio was smaller in
the 1990s than in the 1980s, implying that
developments in the quality of capital
contributed to a rise in measured TFP growth in
the 1990s.
The previous considerations highlight that there
are a number of factors that can explain why the
average contribution to growth from estimated
TFP growth may be smaller or larger than
suggested by basic growth accounting exercises
based on quantity measures of labour and
capital inputs. The balance of these factors, and
thus the part of TFP growth that can be more
closely associated with pure technical progress
or innovations, is essentially an empirical
question. Further attempts to endogenise this
“genuine” TFP growth residual have typically
focused on the role of research and development
(R&D) expenditure. The payoffs from R&D are
inherently random and difficult to predict, but it
is likely that more technological progress will
be made if the efforts directed at achieving it
become greater. In this respect, a cyclical
pattern of R&D, for instance in response to the
availability of internally generated funds, could
account for some correlation between the rate of
pure technical progress and the business cycle.
This would also imply some variation in the rate
of growth of potential output.
Chart 9 Indicators of the quality of the capital stock in the euro area
(as a percentage of total gross capital stock) (net capital stock as a percentage of gross capital stock)
Source: ECB calculations and estimates based on data from Eurostat and the European Commission.
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In the context of the debate on the new
economy, there have been several studies aimed
at explaining the technical progress in measured
TFP growth in terms of the spillover effects
that the use of ICT investment has on the
general efficiency of the economy.10 However,
empirical studies based on sectoral patterns of
labour productivity have failed to produce
convincing evidence for such an effect, both in
the euro area and in economies with a higher
ICT penetration such as the US economy.11 It
appears that ICT-related increases in labour
productivity have thus far been confined to
industries that produce ICT and to some extent
to industries that actually use ICT. In the former
industries the positive impact on labour
productivity would also work through TFP
growth, while in the latter industries it would
work through capital accumulation and capital
deepening.
Nevertheless, ICT is a useful and germane
example that technological progress remains
mostly unpredictable, also after the basic
technical discoveries that underlie it have been
made. Even today, when the use of ICT is
common, the exact extent to which it helped
raise TFP growth is still under debate and
its contribution to future TFP growth is not
known with any degree of accuracy. This limits
the possibility in forward-looking growth
accounting exercises of deviating in the
assumptions for TFP growth from the average
rates that have been observed in the past. This
aspect will be discussed in the next section.
10 For a review of the literature, see for example the contributions
to the symposium on “Computers and Productivity” in the Fall
2000 issue (vol. 14, no. 4) of the Journal of Economic
Perspectives.
11 See the evidence provided by Vijselaar and Albers (2002).
Box
HAVE THERE BEEN BREAKS IN THE MEAN AND VOLATILITY OF GROWTH OF REAL OUTPUT AND THE
MAIN INPUTS OVER THE LONGER TERM?
Assessing average developments in factor inputs over the full length of a business cycle can
provide useful information on trend potential growth. However, it has to be borne in mind that
under such an approach gauging future developments in trend potential growth depends on the
assumption that the average developments observed in the most recent cycle can be carried
forward. This assumption may not be innocuous, as structural breaks can occur within a
business cycle. Against this background, the objective of this box is to examine whether there is
any evidence of structural breaks in the mean and the volatility of the growth rates of real GDP
and the input factors (labour, capital and total factor productivity) over the longer term.
As already discussed in the main text, harmonised national accounts data for the euro area are
only available from 1980. On an annual basis, estimates are available from the European
Commission starting from 1960. These data must be interpreted with the necessary caution for
the years before 1980, but they should provide a general picture regarding the longer-term
trends. Tests for structural breaks are conducted using the method of Bai and Perron.1
Compared with alternative tests in the literature, the Bai-Perron test has several advantages,
including the possibility to test for multiple breaks within a unified framework and to take into
account serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the data.
1 See Bai and Perron (1998) for details on the test and Bai and Perron (2003) for the corresponding critical values.21
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Longer-term trends and breaks in mean growth rates
Over the past four and a half decades, euro area real GDP growth has been on average markedly
positive (see Table 1). However, there is evidence of a break around 1973, after which growth
has been on average less than half that during the preceding period. This evidence is consistent
with the studies on European economic history which refer to the period from 1950 to 1973 as
the Golden Age of European economic growth.2 After 1973 average growth seems to have been
broadly stable between 2.0% and 2.5%.
As for most advanced economic areas, there is also evidence of a productivity slowdown in the
euro area, represented by the clear abrupt decline in average TFP growth after 1973. After the
mid-1970s, average growth in euro area TFP was about one-third of that during the preceding
period. Moreover, there is some evidence of a slight declining trend in TFP growth since 1974.
By contrast, no evidence can yet be found of new economy effects for the euro area around the
mid-1990s, as concluded also in other studies.3
No evidence of structural breaks is detected for total employment growth from 1960 onwards,
although trend growth has been increasing during this period. Thus, while no abrupt change can
be identified, a more gradual structural change cannot be excluded over the longer term. As
regards the capital stock, some evidence for two breaks in the pattern of growth can be found, in
the middle and at the end of the 1970s. After 1980, capital stock growth seems to have been
significantly lower compared with the previous two decades, but broadly constant on average up
to 2003. However, since measurement problems are particularly acute for the capital stock, this
evidence should be interpreted with much caution.
2 See for example Temin (1997).
3 See for example Vijselaar and Albers (2002).
4 See for example the evidence and the references reported by Stock and Watson (2002).
Mean
Mean Before In After Trend
Variable 1960-2003 Breaks1) first break between last break 1960-20032)
Real GDP 3.1 1973 5.1 2.2 broadly constant
TFP 1.6 1973 3.2 1.0 decreasing
Employment 0.5 – increasing
Capital stock3) 3.2 1974, 1980 4.8 3.3 2.3 broadly constant
Table 1 Breaks in long-term mean growth rates
Source: ECB calculations based on data from the European Commission.
1) Break tests are carried out using the test of Bai and Perron (1998) on the growth rate of the series specified. The test options were
chosen such that the first possible break is in 1966 and the last is in 1998.
2) In case of breaks, the reference is to the trend after the (most recent) break found.
3) Capital stock refers to the net capital stock.
 Longer-term trends and breaks in volatility
A number of recent empirical studies have found that there is clear evidence of a reduced
volatility of growth in several macroeconomic variables starting from the early 1980s,
especially for the United States.4 As regards the economies of the euro area, the evidence is22
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Variable 1960-2003 Breaks1) Before break After break 1960-20032)
Real GDP 1.8 1976 1.8 1.2 broadly constant
TFP 1.4 1976 1.4 0.8 increasing
Employment 0.9 – increasing
Capital stock3) 1.2 – decreasing
Table 2 Breaks in long term volatility
Source: ECB calculations based on data from the European Commission.
1) Break tests are carried out using the test of Bai and Perron (1998) to unconditional volatility measured following Stock and Watson
(2002) as the absolute value of the deviation of the quarter-on-quarter growth rate from the average. The test options were chosen such
that the first possible break is in 1966 and the last is in 1998.
2) In case of breaks, the reference is to the trend after the (most recent) break found.
3) Capital stock refers to the net capital stock.
more mixed, as breaks in volatility can be found but seem to be more dispersed in time.5 Thus,
it is not surprising that very limited evidence of breaks in the volatility of growth of some basic
euro area macroeconomic variables can be found. In particular, from 1960 onwards some
evidence of a break in volatility can be detected but only for growth in euro real GDP and TFP
(see Table 2). After the mid-1970s average volatility of growth in these two variables
decreased, remaining broadly stable thereafter for output growth but exhibiting an increasing
trend for TFP.
With regard to the volatility of growth in employment and the capital stock, no clear breaks can
be detected. However, for both employment and TFP growth, volatility seems to have been
increasing from 1960 onwards. By contrast, for the capital stock, the volatility of growth
appears to have been decreasing, compensating for the increased volatility of the other factors of
production.
Overall, the evidence reported indicates that a number of structural breaks took place during the
1970s in both the mean growth rate and the volatility of growth of real GDP and some of the
input factors. It is beyond the scope of this paper to review exhaustively the causes and
consequences of these breaks, but it is likely that most of them are related to the structural
change induced by the oil shocks of the 1970s. This evidence provides further reasons for
focusing the growth accounting analyses of the euro area on the period starting from 1980, as
well as for the lack of harmonised data before that year.23
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4 THE GROWTH ACCOUNTING EXERCISE IN
PRACTICE
This section brings together the developments
in the factors of growth discussed in the
previous sections in terms of the actual
contributions to real GDP growth. The
decompositions are based on an average labour
share of 0.6 and an average capital share of 0.4.
The analysis includes a backward-looking part,
decomposing growth for the past two decades,
as well as a forward-looking part that uses the
growth accounting framework for a scenario
analysis over the horizon up to 2020. The
periods considered in the analysis are
sufficiently long to allow for an interpretation
of the average real GDP growth rates as
indicators of trend potential growth.
4.1 THE DECOMPOSITION OF GROWTH IN THE
PERIOD 1981-2003
Chart 10 reports the sources of real GDP
growth in terms of the contributions from
labour, capital and total factor productivity. The
left-hand and right-hand panels of the chart
refer to the alternative representations of the
production function as described in equation
(1). In the right-hand panel, the sum of the
contributions from TFP and capital intensity
reflects the contribution to growth from labour
productivity. The results confirm the usual
finding in growth accounting exercises that TFP
growth accounts for most of real GDP growth
or is at least the single most important
component. In the 1980s somewhat more than
50% or 1.3 percentage points of real GDP
growth was explained by TFP. The remainder
(slightly less than 50% or 1.0 percentage point)
was accounted for by capital, while labour had a
broadly neutral effect on growth due to the
offsetting effects from increases in employment
and decreases in average hours worked. For the
1990s, the results show a small decline in
average real GDP growth, which essentially
reflects a decline in the contribution from TFP
by around one-third to 0.8 percentage point. By
contrast, the contribution from capital was
broadly unchanged compared with that in the
1980s and labour made a positive contribution
of around 0.4 percentage point or almost 20% of
real GDP growth. More detailed results can be
found in Annex 4.
Capital deepening, i.e. a rise in capital intensity,
is a prevalent feature of the growth process in
industrialised economies. In the 1980s capital
deepening explained half of euro area real
GDP growth, while the contribution declined to
one-third in the 1990s. Together with lower
TFP growth, the slower capital deepening
had a negative impact on growth in labour
(in percentage points) (in percentage points)
Chart 10 Contributions to real GDP growth in the euro area
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat, the European Commission and the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.
Note: Labour is defined in terms of total hours worked, while capital refers to the gross capital stock in 1995 prices. Capital intensity
denotes the ratio of the capital stock to total hours worked. In the right-hand panel labour thus contributes to real GDP growth both directly
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productivity. However, some caution is
warranted when interpreting this development,
as it essentially reflects a reversal of the
unfavourable labour market trends that started
before the 1980s. Relatively strong real wage
growth and inflexible labour markets had
fostered the substitution of capital for labour
and led to a rise in the unemployment rate. In
the 1990s, real wages grew more moderately on
average and labour market reforms led to some
improvement in terms of flexibility. This
slowed the substitution of capital for labour and
allowed for higher employment growth.
Moreover, at the macroeconomic level capital
deepening does not only reflect shifts towards
less labour-intensive production, but also
changes in the employment composition of
industrial sectors. The decline in the rate of
capital deepening between the 1980s and 1990s
thus also reflects a rise in the share of total
employment in particular for those industries
that are characterised by relatively slow capital
deepening. These industries belong to a large
extent to the services sector and may also
have absorbed relatively low-skilled and
inexperienced workers, many of them re-
integrated from unemployment. This may also
partly explain the slowdown in TFP growth,
considering that the estimate of the latter
includes the impact of unmeasured changes in
labour quality. In this respect, the lower TFP
growth may to some extent be interpreted
positively in the sense that it reflects an
increased capacity of the economy to absorb a
previously unused supply of labour.
Nevertheless, assuming for simplicity that
measured TFP growth reflects something like a
natural rate of technological progress,
sustaining real GDP growth in the 1990s would
have required a stronger increase in the quantity
of labour and/or capital inputs. More
specifically, average real GDP growth declined
by 0.2 percentage point and with factor shares
of 0.6 (0.4), growth in total hours worked
(gross capital stock) would need to have been
1/3 (½) percentage point higher than it actually
was in order to sustain real GDP growth. These
magnitudes should be put into perspective with
regard to the underlying components. In the
case of capital, the requirement to stabilise
average real GDP growth would, ceteris
paribus, have implied an average investment-to-
GDP ratio in the 1990s of 22½% and thus a
higher level than was reached during business
cycle peaks. Similarly, in the case of labour it
would for instance have been necessary for
average hours worked to have more or less
stabilised at a level of somewhat more than
1,600 hours per year in the mid-1990s, while
up to 2003 they actually declined further by
around 50 hours.
While the contributions to growth from the
individual components of capital stock growth
have been more or less unchanged between the
1980s and the 1990s, those from the labour
supply components have in some cases changed
substantially. Chart 11 shows that the
contribution from labour force growth was
0.5 percentage point in both the 1980s and
the 1990s. However, in the 1980s most of
this contribution was offset by a rise in the
unemployment rate and a decline in average
hours worked. In the same vein, the higher
contribution to growth from the labour supply
in the 1990s reflects a decrease in the
unemployment rate and a slower decline in
hours worked (see the left-hand panel of
Chart 11). These different developments are
likely to be related first of all to the negative
consequences that the oil shocks of the 1970s
had on developments in the 1980s and second to
the positive impact that partial labour market
reforms had on developments in the 1990s.
The unchanged contribution to real GDP
growth from labour force developments
between the 1980s and 1990s reflects inter alia
an unchanged contribution of 0.2 percentage
point from population growth. At the same time,
it conceals the fact that the contributions
associated with changes in the dependency ratio
and participation rate moved in opposite
directions. While declines in the dependency
ratio made a positive contribution in the 1980s,
subsequent increases implied a negative25
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contribution in the 1990s. However, this effect
was counteracted by a rise in the contribution
from changes in the participation rate. Thus,
while demographic developments have not been
favourable in more recent periods and, as
discussed in the next section, are projected to
become a major factor of concern for future
growth, the experience of the 1990s shows
that the negative impact of demographic
developments on medium to longer-term growth
can be compensated for by other components of
the labour supply.
Two general points can be made about such
accounting exercises. First, they show that
counterbalancing the impact of a strong decline
in TFP growth, as was observed between the
1980s and 1990s, implies a considerable
strengthening in the labour supply and/or fixed
capital formation in order to sustain growth.
Second, given the large magnitudes of the
required change that is, ceteris paribus, implied
for the individual components of labour and
capital, only a combination of different growth-
enhancing measures may realistically lead to the
desired results. More generally, however, the
developments in the United States have shown
that a decline in TFP growth is not an iron law
of economic developments. In this respect, the
Lisbon agenda also calls for reform policies that
lead to a business environment that is more
conducive to innovation and thus higher TFP
growth. The section below highlights these
points in the context of a forward-looking
growth accounting exercise.
4.2 THE DECOMPOSITION OF GROWTH IN
FORWARD-LOOKING SCENARIOS
The historical evaluation of growth
developments in output and factor inputs is
important for assessing the current evolution of
the economy’s supply-side potential. However,
it is also important for assessing the
assumptions underlying forward-looking
growth scenarios. Such scenarios can be
important to provide policy-makers with
quantitative information on policy requirements
or options. This section develops three types of
assumption-based scenarios. The first type
examines the consequences for economic
growth under the assumption that the
developments in factor inputs essentially follow
past patterns. The second type derives the
growth in factor inputs that would be necessary
if real GDP growth were to be sustained at past
levels. Finally, the third type sketches the
impact on economic growth that may be
associated with reaching the employment
targets stated in the Lisbon agenda. All of these
scenarios are of a purely illustrative nature and
Main components (in percentage points) Labour force components (in percentage points) 
Chart 11 Contributions from labour components to real GDP growth in the euro area 
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat, the European Commission and the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.
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should not be confused with projections of
trend potential growth.
The three scenarios share some common
assumptions. In particular, given the
unpredictable nature of technical progress it
appears appropriate to conduct the scenarios
under the assumption of an unchanged average
rate of TFP growth. In this respect, it needs to
be borne in mind that the possible role of ICT in
raising TFP growth is still under debate.
Scenarios could thus be envisaged where
average TFP growth in the euro area increases
to similar magnitudes as those currently
recorded for the United States, depending on
how quickly the production and use of ICT gain
further importance in the overall economic
process. There is some consensus that the
successful introduction of new technologies, in
turn, depends on how quickly the economy can
be made flexible through structural reforms. A
technology shock of the same size as in the
United States should thus not be expected to
lead to a similar rise in average TFP growth as
long as there are institutional differences with
regard to labour market rigidities and capital
adjustment costs. Obviously, the objectives
stated in the Lisbon agenda address a number of
these institutional differences and might thus
also imply a case for different assumptions with
regard to average TFP growth.
In addition to unchanged TFP growth, all the
scenarios below also assume an unchanged rate
of capital deepening. According to equation (1),
this implies unchanged growth in labour
productivity. This assumption is naturally more
difficult to justify than that of unchanged TFP
growth alone. Changes in the capital-to-labour
ratio depend on developments in relative factor
prices and on sectoral shifts within the overall
economy. Moreover, the analysis of historical
data suggests that for the euro area there have
typically been trade-offs between higher labour
productivity growth and lower employment
growth, and vice versa. Bearing in mind this
caveat, the assumption makes it possible to
focus exclusively on the contribution to real
GDP growth from the labour supply and thus
on one of the prominent policy issues in the
context of the Lisbon agenda.
In the medium to longer term, the labour supply
will to a large extent be determined by
demographic developments. The available long-
term projections by national statistical institutes
suggest that population growth in the euro area
will decline over the period up to 2020 and that
after this point the population will shrink in
absolute terms. Moreover, the negative impact
that this would have on the potential labour
supply is reinforced by the fact that the share
of older persons is expected to rise and lead
to a concomitant increase in the dependency
ratio. As a result, the working age population
is expected to shrink before 2020. More
specifically, following an average rate of
growth of 0.2% in the 1990s, the working age
population is projected to stagnate on average in
the period up to 2010 and to decline by 0.2% per
annum in the further period up to 2020. The
equivalent projections by the United Nations
imply very similar demographic developments.
When taking these projections as a given, it
needs to be borne in mind that they are
exclusively based on assumptions about
fertility, life expectancy and migration and thus
do not take into account a number of socio-
economic factors that may be relevant but
cannot be properly measured.
Given the constant features in the three
scenarios, the analysis is effectively limited
to different assumptions for the developments
in labour utilisation, which in the present
growth accounting framework is expressed
as a function of the participation rate, the
unemployment rate and average hours worked
per person employed.
The first scenario considers the case where
developments in labour utilisation maintain
unchanged dynamics compared with those
in the 1990s (see Table 1). In this case, the
adverse demographic developments would
reduce average real GDP growth in the period
up to 2010 to below 2% and in the period up to
2020 further to around 1½%. The unchanged27
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dynamics would imply that the participation rate
reaches levels comparable to those in the United
States by 2020, while the unemployment rate
would still be somewhat above the longer-term
average in the United States and above levels
prevailing in the euro area before 1980. Finally,
hours worked would decline further, reflecting
to a large extent the extrapolation of the picture
in the 1990s, when the strong increases in
participation were associated with a rising share
of part-time employment.
The second scenario considers the requirements
in terms of growth rates of the individual labour
input components if real GDP growth were to
be sustained at the level of 2%. Ceteris paribus,
this would for instance require growth in the
participation rate of around 0.8% per annum,
Constant features Variable features
Labour Working age Participation Unemployment Hours worked
productivity population rate rate per person Real GDP
1993-2003 1.4   0.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.3 2.0
2003-2010 1.4   0.0 0.8 -0.1 -0.3 2.0
2010-2020 1.4 -0.2 1.0 -0.1 -0.3 2.0
2003-2010 1.4   0.0 0.6 -0.3 -0.3 2.0
2010-2020 1.4 -0.2 0.6 -0.6 -0.3 2.0
2003-2010 1.4   0.0 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 2.0
2010-2020 1.4 -0.2 0.6 -0.1   0.1 2.0
Table 2 Scenario for labour input growth if real GDP growth were to be sustained
(percentages)
Source: ECB calculations based on equation A7 in Annex I.
Constant features Variable features
Labour Working age Participation Unemployment Hours worked
productivity population rate rate per person Real GDP
Percentages
1993-2003 1.4   0.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.3 2.0
2003-2010 1.4   0.0 0.6 -0.1 -0.3 1.8
2010-2020 1.4 -0.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.3 1.6
End-of-period levels
2003 71.7   8.9  1,557
2010 74.6   8.0  1,521
2020 79.0   6.7  1,471
Table 1 Scenario for real GDP growth if factor inputs were to grow in line with past
patterns
Source: ECB calculations based on equation A7 in Annex I.
considerably stronger than in any period of the
past (see Table 2). Under this scenario, the
participation rate would need to reach a level of
around 75% by 2010 and of almost 85% by
2020. In Europe, such high participation rates
have only been observed in smaller economies
such as Iceland or Switzerland. Sustaining real
GDP growth through stronger growth in the
labour supply could also be achieved through a
faster decline in the unemployment rate or a
stabilisation in average hours worked. Ceteris
paribus, the unemployment rate would have to
decline to 6½% by 2010 and to below 1% by
2020. In the case of average hours worked, a
small further decline of around 10 hours by
2010 and a similar increase by 2020 would be
sufficient. This implies that the ratio of part-
time employment should more or less stabilise,28
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or that with unchanged part-time dynamics a
longer average working week would generate
the additional labour supply.
Finally, the third scenario assumes that the
employment rate (as a percentage of the
working age population) reaches 70% in 2010,
as stated in the targets set in the Lisbon agenda
for Europe. Applying this target also to the euro
area and considering that some countries have
already achieved relatively high employment
rates, the target implies considerable adjustment
pressure on the remaining countries. For the
period after 2010, the scenario assumes that
labour supply dynamics return to the pace
observed in the 1990s, as was already assumed
in the first scenario. The mechanics of the
growth accounting framework suggest that the
Lisbon employment target can be achieved by
more quickly raising participation or by more
quickly reducing the unemployment rate.
Ceteris paribus, the participation rate would
need to increase by 0.9% per annum, reaching a
level of 76% in 2010, while the unemployment
rate would have to decline by 0.4 percentage
point per annum to a level of 6¼% in 2010 (see
Table 3). In each case the associated increase in
labour supply growth would raise average real
GDP growth to 2.1%, slightly higher than in
the 1990s but still slightly lower than in the
1980s. It should be noted, however, that the
employment target is only one of the targets in
the Lisbon agenda related to labour supply.
Achieving in addition the target of raising
the effective retirement age by five years by
Constant features Variable features
Labour Working age Participation Unemployment Hours worked
productivity population rate rate per person Real GDP
1993-2003 1.4   0.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.3 2.0
2003-2010 1.4   0.0 0.9 -0.1 -0.3 2.1
2010-2020 1.4 -0.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.3 1.6
2003-2010 1.4   0.0 0.6 -0.4 -0.3 2.1
2010-2020 1.4 -0.2 0.6 -0.1 -0.3 1.6
Table 3 Scenario for real GDP growth if Lisbon employment target were to be reached
by 2010
(percentages)
Source: ECB calculations based on equation A7 in Annex I.
2010 would obviously also generate a further
potential supply of labour.
The scenario analysis above shows that there is
some scope for sustaining or even raising
medium to longer-term output growth by
accelerating growth in the labour supply.
The ceteris paribus nature of the analysis
emphasises that a focus on individual
components of the labour supply may imply
dynamics that significantly exceed those
observed in past periods. However, addressing
several components at the same time will reduce
the requirements of each individual component
and may also be necessary in the light of the
interrelationships that exist between the
dynamics of the individual growth components.
Policy-makers thus need to exercise the
necessary caution in using the information from
growth accounting exercises.29
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5 CONCLUSIONS
Growth accounting provides a useful
framework for analysing medium to longer-
term developments in real GDP and can thus
help in assessing potential output growth. In
particular, it allows the relative importance and
quantitative contribution of the individual
supply-side factors of growth to be identified
and summarised. In this respect, the results
from growth accounting exercises crucially
depend on the availability of data on the
quantity and quality of labour and capital
inputs. Data limitations will inevitably show up
in the rate of growth in total factor productivity,
which is derived as a residual and, in growth
accounting exercises, usually emerges as the
single most important driving force of longer-
term growth. The results of this paper are no
exception: over the past two decades, estimated
total factor productivity has accounted for more
than half of real GDP growth in the euro area.
Growth accounting does not aim to explain the
underlying forces of economic growth such as
institutions and economic policies, or the
behavioural relationships that ultimately drive
technological progress, physical capital
accumulation or the labour supply and the
linkages between the developments in these
individual factors. In this respect, growth
accounting exercises can only be a useful
complement to model-based approaches to
estimating and assessing potential output. This
is particularly true for the production function
approach to potential output estimation.12
Nevertheless, analyses based on average
contributions to growth over sufficiently long
time periods such as a full economic cycle may
be useful for gauging the sustainable rates of
economic growth and thus, for instance,
underpin the ECB’s assumption for trend
potential growth.
This paper shows that the developments in
supply-side factors are subject to considerable
variation over the economic cycle. Given the
various underlying driving forces, it can thus be
difficult to separate the more temporary
movements from the sustainable rates of growth
by means of economic models or to arbitrarily
5 CONCLUSIONS
smooth out such variations using statistical
filters. As a result, estimates of potential
output growth will usually inevitably display
some variation characterising unsustainable
developments. Moreover, when assessing
potential output growth, the properties of the
data, including possible breaks related to
structural reforms, need to be taken into account
in order to avoid misleading results. The
discussion of the labour input components
shows that the detection of breaks, for example
resulting from the gradual impact of successive
labour market reforms, may require a long time.
The problem of timely detection of structural
change is very difficult to deal with in both the
purely data-based growth accounting exercises
and the model-based approaches to estimating
potential output. By exploiting all relevant
sources of information, including for instance
timely business surveys, and cross-checking
this information with the results from the
analysis of growth developments, this problem
can be mitigated to some extent.
The forward-looking growth accounting
exercises conducted in this paper have shown
that there is some scope for sustaining or even
raising medium to longer-term output growth
despite the adverse demographic developments
expected in the years ahead. There appear to be
two main areas where improvements are
warranted and where the Lisbon agenda states
the relevant objectives. First, structural reform
in product and labour markets could improve
the business environment in a way that allows
for more innovation and technical progress.
Second, there is a considerable potential for
increasing the contributions to growth from the
labour supply, considering that the (structural)
unemployment rate in the euro area is still
relatively high by international standards and
that the participation rate and average hours
worked are relatively low. This requires further
labour market reforms, which can be seen as an
essential part of any strategy aimed at raising
trend potential output growth.
12 See for example Proietti et al. (2002).30
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Starting from equation (1) in the main text, this
annex decomposes the generic factors labour
and capital into economically meaningful
components.
As regards labour, total hours worked H
reflects the product of employment E and
average hours worked per person employed h.
Employment, in turn, is defined as the
difference between the labour force N and total
unemployment U and can be expressed as a
function of the unemployment rate ur. The
labour force is the product of the participation
rate pr and the working age population PWA (i.e.
the number of persons aged 15 to 64). Finally,
the working age population is a function of total
population P and the dependency ratio dr,
where the latter is defined as the number of
persons below 15 and above 64 as a ratio of the
working age population. These identities are
summarised in equations A1-A4 below.




As regards capital, measures of the capital stock
are typically compiled on the basis of the
perpetual inventory method, i.e. accumulating
gross investment I and at the same time
allowing for retirement D of existing capital
(see equation A5). Retirement captures the
physical removal and scrapping of capital goods
from the capital stock due to technical or
economic obsolescence. The capital stock in the
period ahead thus consists of the capital stock
available at the beginning of the current period
plus the net additions made during the current
period. This implies that the rate of growth in
the capital stock can be expressed as the sum of
the investment-to-capital ratio i and the
retirement rate d (see equation A6). It should be
noted that this measure of the capital stock does
not take into account the degree of utilisation of
the capital stock through time and, in principle,
ANNEX 1 DECOMPOSITION OF THE BROAD
FACTORS OF GROWTH
thus captures capital inputs to potential rather
than actual output growth.
 (A5)
 (A6)
Putting all these identities into the production
function and expressing the latter in terms of
rates of growth (denoted by g) shows that
real GDP growth can be decomposed into
the contributions from total factor productivity
A, investment and depreciation rates, hours
worked per person, population, the
unemployment rate, the participation rate
and the dependency ratio. It should be noted
that increases in the capital retirement rate, the
unemployment rate and the dependency ratio
have a negative impact on real GDP growth.
(A7)
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Population: Number of people living in the euro area. 
Working age population: Population aged between 15 and 64 years.
Dependency ratio: Number of persons in the population that are not of working age as a
percentage of the working age population.
Labour  force: Sum of employed and unemployed persons. The number of
unemployed persons is calculated on the basis of data for employment
and the unemployment rate. The figure may be different from that in
the Labour Force Survey as the latter includes only employed persons
aged between 15 and 64 years. 
Participation rate: Number of persons in the labour force as a percentage of the working
age population. 
Unemployment rate: Number of unemployed persons (defined according to ILO
recommendations) as a percentage of the labour force.
Employment: Sum of employees and self-employed persons. 
Hours worked: Number of paid hours worked per year and per person employed. This
includes the hours of persons that have several jobs at the same time.
The estimates used in this paper include paid overtime but exclude paid
hours that are not worked due to annual leave, sick leave, parental
leave, etc.
Capital stock: Sum of produced fixed assets that provide ongoing services by being
used repeatedly or continuously in production processes for more than
one year. In the national accounts, capital includes tangible as well as
intangible assets. 
Labour share: Compensation of employees as a percentage of GDP. The adjusted
share takes into account the fact that part of the mixed income of the
self-employed is essentially labour income. The adjustment is based
on the assumption that the average compensation of a self-employed
person equals that of an employee.
ANNEX 2 GLOSSARY AND DATA SOURCES34
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DATA SOURCES
The euro area-wide data used in this paper come
from different sources. Eurostat provides
official euro area-wide data for real GDP, fixed
capital formation, unemployment and
population for the period from 1991. Data for
the period 1980-1990 are ECB calculations
based on the harmonised national accounts data
for the individual Member States and compiled
according to the same methodology as that
applied by Eurostat. For the number of
employed persons, the calculations cover the
whole period since 1980 as Eurostat thus far
only publishes an index of employment. The
few gaps in the data for individual years in
individual countries were filled on the basis of
data from the European Commission’s AMECO
database. In the case of Germany, data prior to
1991 have been obtained on the basis of
developments in West Germany.
Data on annual hours worked for the individual
Member States were taken from the Total
Economy Database of the Groningen Growth
and Development Centre and The Conference
Board (February 2004, http://www.ggdc.net).
The euro area-wide series was calculated on the
basis of the countries’ employment shares.
Data on the working age population are
calculated on the basis of data taken from the
European Commission’s AMECO database.
More precisely, the working age population has
been calculated as the product of Eurostat
population data and the dependency ratio
implied by the AMECO database.
Data on the euro area capital stock are ECB
estimates, produced in the Directorate General
Statistics and compiled according to the
perpetual inventory method. The estimates for
the various categories of the capital stock are
based on three components: (i) estimates of the
starting values for the respective capital stock
series in 1980; (ii) Eurostat data for gross fixed
capital formation in the euro area; (iii) and
estimates of the retirement and depreciation
rates pertaining to the respective capital stock
series. The estimates of the starting values are
deducted from a GDP-to-capital ratio in 1980
that is based on national data covering more
than 80% of the euro area GDP weight.
Similarly, the euro area-wide retirement and
depreciation rates are compiled from national
data for the capital stock and gross fixed capital
formation covering more than 80% of the euro
area.
Population projections over the period 2003-
2020 are based on Eurostat’s demographic
scenarios, which were compiled in 1995 and
revised in 1999 with the assistance of national
statistical offices. The paper uses the medium
variant of these projections.35
ECB
Occasional Paper No. 22
January 2005
ANNEX 3
ANNEX 3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON FACTORS
OF GROWTH
Table A3.1 Growth in the labour input and its components
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat, the European Commission and the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.
Growth in
Demographic components Labour utilisation components
labour supply Total Changes in the Participation Changes Growth
(total hours population dependency rate growth in the per  in hours
worked) growth ratio unemployment worked
rate per person
Percentages
1981-1993 -0.2 0.4 -0.5 0.1 0.3 -0.6
1993-2003   0.6 0.3   0.2 0.6 0.0 -0.3
1981-2003   0.1 0.3 -0.2 0.3 0.1 -0.5
Standard deviation
1981-1993   1.4 0.2   0.6 0.6 0.7 0.5
1993-2003   1.1 0.1   0.1 0.5 0.7 0.3
1981-2003   1.2 0.2   0.6 0.6 0.7 0.4
Table A3.2 Growth in the labour force and its components
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat and the European Commission.
Labour
Demographic perspective Composition Memo items
force Working age Participation Employment Unemployment Dependency Employment
growth population growth rate growth rate ratio rate
Percentages
1981-1993 0.8 0.7 67.1 0.5 9.0 50.3 61.1
1993-2003 0.7 0.2 69.4 0.9 9.7 49.4 62.7
1981-2003 0.8 0.5 68.1 0.7 9.3 50.0 61.9
Standard deviation
1981-1993 0.5 0.3 0.8 1.2 0.9 2.3 1.3
1993-2003 0.4 0.1 1.5 1.1 1.1 0.5 2.1
1981-2003 0.5 0.3 1.7 1.0 1.0 1.8 1.836
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Table A3.3 Growth in the capital stock and its components
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat and the European Commission.




Capital stock Investment-to ratio (capital Retirement utilisation in
growth Total GDP ratio productivity) rate manufacturing
Percentages
1981-1993 2.8 4.7 20.9 22.6 1.9 80.8
1993-2003 2.4 4.5 20.9 21.5 2.1 81.8
1981-2003 2.6 4.6 21.0 22.1 2.0 81.4
Standard deviation
1981-1993 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.2 3.1
1993-2003 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.1 1.8
1981-2003 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.2 2.6
Table A3.4 Growth in total factor productivity
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat, the European Commission and the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.
Note: The adjustment for capacity utilisation assumes that the business sector has the same rate of capacity utilisation and that the business
sector’s share of the total capital stock is around 42%.
Not adjusted for hours Adjusted for hours worked Memo items
Growth
Changes in in average
Not adjusted Adjusted for Not adjusted Adjusted for capacity hours worked
for capacity capacity for capacity capacity utilisation in per employed
utilisation utilisation utilisation utilisation manufacturing person
Percentages
1981-1993 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.3 0.0 -0.6
1993-2003 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.3 -0.3
1981-2003 0.7 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.1 -0.5
Standard deviation
1981-1993 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.5 2.2 0.5
1993-2003 0.8 0.5 0.8 0.5 2.1 0.3
1981-2003 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.6 2.0 0.437
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ANNEX 4
ANNEX 4 DETAILED DECOMPOSITION
OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO REAL GDP
GROWTH
Table A4.1 Contributions to real GDP growth in the euro area
(percentages)
Contribution from growth in:
Real GDP growth TFP Labour Capital
1981-2003 2.1 1.0 0.1 1.0
48% 6% 46%
1981-1993 2.2 1.3 -0.1 1.0
56% -3% 47%
1993-2003 2.0 0.8 0.4 0.9
37% 18% 45%
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat, the European Commission and the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.
Note: Figures may not add up due to rounding.
Table A4.2 Contributions to growth from the labour supply and its main components
(percentages)
Labour
 Main labour components Main employment components
supply (total Hours worked Labour Unemployment
Real GDP
hours worked) per person Employment force rate
growth a=b+c b c=d+e d e
1981-2003 2.1 0.1 -0.3 0.4 0.5 0.0
6% -15% 21% 23% -2%
1981-1993 2.2 -0.1 -0.4 0.3 0.5 -0.1
-3% -18% 15% 22% -6%
1993-2003 2.0 0.4 -0.2 0.6 0.5 0.1
18% -10% 28% 22% 3%
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat, the European Commission and the Groningen Growth and Development Centre.
Note: Figures may not add up due to rounding.38
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Table A4.4 Contributions to growth from the capital stock and its components
(percentages)
Capital stock Investment-to- Retirement
growth capital ratio rate
Real GDP growth a=b+c b c
1981-2003 2.1 1.0 1.7 -0.8
46% 81% -35%
1981-1993 2.2 1.0 1.8 -0.7
47% 80% -33%
1993-2003 2.0 0.9 1.7 -0.8
45% 83% -38%
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat and the European Commission.
Note: Figures may not add up due to rounding.
Source: ECB calculations based on data from Eurostat and the European Commission.
Note: Figures may not add up due to rounding.
Table A4.3 Contributions to growth from the labour force and its components
(percentages)
Demographic components Working age population components
Labour Participation Working age Total Dependency
Real GDP
force rate population population ratio
growth a=b+c b c=d+e d e
1981-2003 2.1 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.1
23% 9% 14% 10% 3%
1981-1993 2.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2
22% 3% 20% 10% 8%
1993-2003 2.0 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 -0.1
22% 18% 7% 10% -3%39
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